Two experiments examined whether experience gained with a series of reaction time tests Multi-Health Systems Inc.] influenced the performance of individuals instructed to simulate the cognitive effects of a traumatic brain injury. Experience with the tests was manipulated by varying the order and number of tests administered for simulator and control groups. Simulators responded significantly slower and exhibited increased variability compared to controls. Performance was not affected by order or number of tests. The results of a third experiment showed that criterion scores could be established that correctly classified members of control, simulator, mild TBI, and severe TBI groups. Overall, the results suggest that the performance of the simulators was based on a context-free, absolute judgment and that reaction time measures show considerable promise for detecting low effort.
In view of the above, various types of reaction time (RT) tests, such as those that have been used extensively to measure speed of responding in cognitive psychology and psychophysics, should be particularly sensitive to detecting this malingering strategy of responding slowly on neuropsychological testing. There is some evidence to support this speculation. For example, Strauss, Spellacy, Hunter, and Berry (1994) reported that a simulator group performed significantly poorer than both control and head-injured groups on a simple auditory RT test. The authors recommended that RT measures be included in neuropsychological evaluations to provide useful information regarding malingering. Wogar, Broek, Bradshaw, and Szabaldi (1998) reported a negative linear relationship between RTs and task difficulty on eight matching-to-sample tasks administered to control, simulator, and head-injured groups. Furthermore, the headinjured group exhibited a steeper slope than either the control or simulator group leading the authors to conclude that simulators were unable to successfully feign the effects of head injury. Willison and Tombaugh (2006) administered a recently developed series of RT tests, the Computerized Tests of Information Processing (CTIP: Tombaugh & Rees, in press) , to simulator, control, mild traumatic brain injury (TBI), and severe TBI groups. Individuals attempting to simulate cognitive deficits associated with TBI obtained longer RT scores, made more incorrect responses, and exhibited increased variability than did controls and individuals with mild or severe TBI. Sensitivity values tended to be higher than those achieved by the Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM; Tombaugh, 1996) and specificity scores were also very high, with the CTIP identifying virtually all members of the control and mild TBI groups.
Various explanations as to why malingerers respond slowly have been proposed. van Gorp et al. (1999) suggested that a lack of knowledge regarding specific response latency characteristics of a particular disorder, as well as an inability to accurately time responses, may be important variables while Brandt (1988) indicated that increased information processing time is required for incorrect responding and this is a major determinant in slower RTs. More specifically, Cercy, Schretlen, and Brandt (1997) have proposed that a two-level decision process involving (1) the identification of the correct response followed by (2) fabrication of an incorrect response contributes to the increased response latency of malingerers.
Based on qualitative data from a post-study questionnaire, Bolan et al. (2002) proposed that indecision was responsible for slow responses exhibited by simulators. The authors stated that "simulators often reported knowing the correct answer but presumably had to decide -based on their performance thus far -whether to answer correctly or incorrectly" (p. 162). Lee et al. (2002) reported that "the most popular cognitive strategy adopted by a majority of individuals faking memory impairment was to calculate the proportion of correct to incorrect responses by answering most of them, but not all, incorrectly" (p. 158). These findings posit that individuals attempting to simulate a malingered performance are sensitive to incoming information that occurs during the testing situation and suggest that this information will be instrumental in determining how they will perform. This statement carries with it the clear implication that individuals should also be sensitive to contextual effects that arise during testing and the manipulation of such effects may moderate their performance. Others have also alluded to the possibility that the performance of malingerers depends, at least in part, to events that occur within a testing session. Bernard (1990) observed that administering more difficult tests early in a session may serve to sensitize malingerers to the simplicity of malingering tests administered later in the session. This concept is similar to that of contrast effects reported in perception and cognition studies. A contrast effect is the enhancement or diminishment of a perception and related performance as a result of immediately previous or simultaneous exposure to a stimulus in the same dimension, of lesser or greater value, as compared to when a comparison stimulus is absent (Thurstone, 1927) . To illustrate simply, a lifted weight will be perceived to be heavier than normal when preceded by the lifting of a lighter weight and it will be perceived to be lighter than normal when preceded by a heavier weight. Bolan et al. (2002) and Tombaugh (1996) state that malingered performances are most readily detected when the perceived difficulty of the test is greater than the actual difficulty. That is, the test-takers must perceive the tests as being difficult for those with genuine impairment. They go on to explain that malingerers will tend to underperform, in a mistaken attempt at impersonating individuals with true memory impairment. So then, the question becomes on what basis do they form their perception of difficulty-is it a relative or absolute judgment? Based on the evidence presented above it would seem that malingerers would make use of contextual information gathered during the test session and thus would form their perception of the difficulty of any given test in reference to tests that have already been administered.
Two experiments were undertaken to evaluate this concept that contextual information obtained during the testing session influences an individual's judgment of the relative difficulty of a test which, in turn, will affect the speed at which a malingerer will respond. In each experiment, the CTIP tests were administered to simulators and controls. The CTIP was designed to measure speed of information processing by progressively increasing cognitive demands over three tasks [i.e., Simple RT (SRT), Choice RT (CRT), and Semantic Search RT (SemRT)]. In Experiment I the order of administration of the CTIP tests was varied so that half of each group received the SRT and SemRT in reverse orders. That is, half of each group received the most difficult task (SemRT) first while the remaining half received the least difficult task (SRT) first. This allowed the effects of order on both SRT and SemRT scores to be examined. In Experiment II, all tests were administered in the increasing order of difficulty but half of the participants received all three tests while the other half only received the SRT and SemRT tests (i.e., the CRT test was not administered). This permitted the effects of removing the intermediate choice task on SemRT scores to be examined.
Two hypotheses were proposed. First, simulators were expected to obtain longer reaction time scores on all tests compared with controls because of the additional cognitive processing that is assumed to be involved with malingering. Secondly, test scores in the simulator group were predicted to differ depending on the order and number of tests administered. This difference was anticipated because participants received different contextual information that was expected to affect the perceived difficulty of a given test and consequently determine how quickly one would respond on that test. Simulators receiving the tests in the increasing order of difficulty were anticipated to obtain greater SemRT scores (i.e., a worse performance) compared with simulators receiving the tests in the order of decreasing difficulty. Since the former group of simulators would have the experience of the simple task first, they were expected to adjust their performance on the semantic test so their scores on this apparently more difficult task would be appropriately worse than their SRT scores. In contrast, simulators who did not have the experience of the simple task to help them determine their level of performance on the semantic task were expected to attain shorter SemRT response times than the simulators who initially completed the SRT test.
The ability to develop cut-off scores that reliably classify individuals as malingering is an important attribute to assess for any test of effort. In order to determine the utility of the CTIP scores for making such classifications, a third experiment was conducted where optimal cut-off values were derived from normative data and the percentage of individuals from control, simulator, mild TBI, and severe TBI groups falling above and below the cut-offs was examined.
Experiment I
1.1. Method
Participants and procedure
A 2 × 2 factorial design was employed which varied effort (simulator vs. control) and order of task complexity (increasing vs. decreasing) resulting in four groups designated as follows: control-increasing; control-decreasing, simulator-increasing; simulator-decreasing. Each group was composed of 10 university students who were enrolled in an introductory psychology course and who received course credit for participating. The mean ages for the groups ranged from 19.60 to 20.50 years. An ANOVA appropriate to a 2 × 2 factorial design did not yield any significant age differences between the four groups.
The effects of effort were manipulated by instructing half of the participants to "try their hardest" while the other half were asked to simulate the cognitive effects of a TBI. Simulators were read the following scenario.
"In this study you will be asked to complete a set of tasks that are often used to measure a variety of changes that occur in people who have brain damage. As you take each test, I would like you to assume the role of someone who has experienced some type of brain damage from a car accident.
Pretend that you were involved in a head-on collision. You hit your head against the windshield and were unconscious for 15 min. You were hospitalized overnight for observation and then released. Gradually, over the past few months, you have started to feel normal again. However, your lawyer has informed you that you may get a larger court settlement if you look like you are still suffering from brain damage. In the real world, the usual purpose of the tests you are about to take is to determine if the accident has produced any impairment in your abilities due to brain damage.
As you portray the above person, try to approach each test as you imagine this person would respond if he or she had been given the same instructions from his or her lawyer or from someone else hoping to influence the amount of the settlement. Keep in mind that settlement monies depend upon your being diagnosed as cognitively impaired on these tests. Also be aware that having a lawsuit pending often raises the suspicion that people may try to exaggerate their difficulties. That means your impairments resulting from the head injury must be believable. Major exaggerations, such as not being able to do anything, remembering absolutely nothing, or completely failing to respond, are easy to detect."
The simulator group was given approximately one week to prepare and were told they could use any resources they wished to. When these participants returned approximately one week later they were questioned on the scenario, and if they were unable to sufficiently recall the scenario it was read again. The order of the tasks was manipulated by administering the two CTIP tests in different orders. Half of the participants received the least complex test (SRT) first and the most complex test (SemRT) second. The remaining half of the participants received the reverse order-SemRT first and SRT second. The CTIP tests were administered within the context of a brief neuropsychological battery. Only the scores of the CTIP are reported here. Testing took approximately 1 h to complete. Tombaugh & Rees, in press ). Simple RT. SRT measures the amount of time required to process and react to a simple stimulus and serves as a baseline for the other tests. On each of 30 trials, participants press the space bar as soon as a single stimulus (X) appears in the centre of a computer screen. The time required to respond is recorded. Ten practice trials precede the testing series.
Materials 1.1.2.1. Computerized Tests of Information Processing (CTIP:
Semantic search RT. SemRT increases the complexity of cognitive processing by adding a conceptual decision component. Participants decide whether a word belongs to a specific category (conceptual/semantic processing). On each of 30 trials, 1 of 4 categories (weapon, furniture, bird, or fruit) is randomly presented on a computer screen. Two seconds later a word appears below the category that either represents a member of that category (press right key, "?") or not (press left key, "Z"). The time required to respond and the number of correct responses are recorded. Ten practice trials precede the testing series.
Results
The existence of large differences in variance prompted non-parametric analyses to be performed. The ranked ordering of both the RT scores on the CTIP tests and the coefficients of variation (CV) for the RT scores were used as input data for these analyses. These non-parametric analyses produced results identical to those of their parametric equivalents, suggesting that the differences in variance did not have a significant impact on the parametric statistics. Because the non-parametric and parametric analyses yielded the same results, only the results of the parametric analyses are reported. Fig. 1 shows the effects of effort and order of presentation on reaction time. Performance was faster for the SRT task than for the SemRT task, and controls were faster than simulators on both CTIP tests. The order in which the tests were administered did not appear to exert any significant effect on performance. A 2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA on RT scores with effort and order as the between-subject variables and test as the within-subject variable substantiated these observations, Effort [F(1, 36) Willison and Tombaugh (2006) found individuals attempting to simulate attention deficits exhibited greater variability in RT scores than controls and TBI patients. Consequently, several different measures of variability were calculated including the standard deviation (S.D.), coefficient of variation (CV), interquartile range, and variance. Because all measures yielded equivalent results only the CV ((S.D./M) × 100) will be reported (see Fig. 2 ). The CV provides a measure of variability that takes into account both standard deviation and the mean and thus controls for the fact that larger mean scores are typically associated with greater variability. A 2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA revealed that simulators exhibited greater variability than controls with the difference being greater for SRT than SemRT [Effort: F(1, 36) 
Discussion
These results are congruent with the hypothesis that simulators would obtain longer reaction time scores on the tests compared with controls and suggest that RT tests are sensitive to malingering. However, the results unexpectedly did not support the hypothesis that test scores in the simulator group would differ depending on the order that the tests were administered. Apparently simulators did not use the information gained from the previous test to judge the relative difficulty of the subsequent test and respond accordingly. That is, they performed on each test as if they were using an absolute rather than a relative judgment.
Experiment II
The failure to find any order effects in Experiment I prompted a further investigation into whether the manipulation of experience with the tests affects the performance of participants instructed to malinger. If the presumption that simulators are not influenced by the immediately preceding test is correct, then information gained from additional experience prior to the semantic test should not substantially alter the performance of the simulators on the semantic test. The following experiment tested this hypothesis by adding a test of intermediate difficulty (CRT) between the simple and semantic tasks for half of the participants.
Method

Participants and procedure
Effort (simulator vs. control) was factorially combined with number of tests (two vs. three). Since order of tests was not shown to exert significant effects in Experiment I, the procedure typically used with the CTIP was followed where all tests were administered in the ascending order of cognitive complexity. The data from the two increasing groups in Experiment I were compared with two groups 1 who received all three of the CTIP tests including CRT. The four groups all contained 10 participants and are designated as follows: control-two, control-three, simulator-two, simulator-three. The mean ages for these groups ranged from 19.40 to 20.50 years. An ANOVA appropriate to a 2 × 2 factorial design did not yield any significant age differences between the four groups. Tombaugh & Rees, in press ). In addition to receiving the simple and semantic tasks described earlier, half of the participants also received the CRT test described below.
Materials 2.1.2.1. Computerized Tests of Information Processing (CTIP:
Choice RT. CRT increases the complexity of processing from the simple task by adding a decisional component that was based on processing the "form" of the stimulus (concrete/literal processing). On each of 30 trials, participants press either the right ("?") or left ("Z") key depending on which of two words ("duck" or "kite", respectively) appear in the centre of a computer screen. The time required to respond and number correct are recorded. Ten practice trials precede the testing series.
Results
The scores presented in Fig. 3 show that the introduction of the CRT test did not significantly affect the performance of either the simulators or controls. A 2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA revealed that the RT of the malingerers was significantly slower than that of the controls [ Effort: F(1, 36) 
Discussion
Overall, the results of Experiment II are consistent with those reported previously for Experiment I. Thus, neither the order of the tests nor the number of tests significantly altered the scores on the SRT or SemRT tests. All of the previous analyses, however, have focused on group comparisons and have not directly addressed the question of the degree to which the CTIP is able to detect individuals who simulate the performance of TBI patients in a clinical situation. That is, the clinical efficacy of the CTIP to detect malingering has not been established. One way to provide this information is to determine the sensitivity and specificity of the CTIP scores with a sample of TBI patients. Experiment III undertakes such an analysis.
Experiment III
The objective of this experiment was to establish criterion scores in order to determine the relative ability of RT and CV scores to identify simulators. In addition to comparing the utility of those two indices, the simple and semantic tasks were compared to determine their relative ability to detect simulation.
Method
Participants and procedure
Because no effects of order or number of tests were found, the control and simulator participants from Experiments I and II were combined to form the Control (N = 30) and Simulation (N = 30) groups. Additionally, groups of Mild TBI (N = 37) and Severe TBI (N = 29) patients were drawn from an existing pool of TBI participants (Tombaugh, 2007) . Some of these scores have previously been presented by Tombaugh, Rees, Stormer, Harrison, and Smith (2007) and Tombaugh, Rees, Stormer, Harrison, and Smith (submitted for publication). All participants in the mild TBI group had a Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) >13 or loss of consciousness (LOC) <5 min at the time of the accident or at admission at emergency. All participants were tested within approximately 1 month of the injury (median = 29.5 days, range 15-300 days) as part of an ongoing study at a local hospital. Six members were involved in assaults, 16 in falls, 10 in motor vehicle accidents (MVAs), 4 in contact sports accidents, and 1 unspecified.
Participants in the Severe TBI group were experiencing some type of significant cognitive problem and were recruited from local neuropsychologists and physiatrists. No GCS scores were available. LOC information was available from 16 patients and ranged from "brief'" to 3 months. A considerable range of time had elapsed from the time of injury to test (median 330 days, range = 22 days to 25 years). Twenty members of the group were involved in MVAs, 7 in falls, 1 assault, and 1 unspecified. No Mild or Severe TBI patient was involved in litigation or disability claim.
The mean ages for the four groups ranged from 19.68 to 28.31 years. A one-way ANOVA did yield significant age differences between the groups [F(3, 122) = 13.73, p < .001]. However, differences in age do not appear to exert any important effects on RT performance within this age bracket (Tombaugh & Rees, in press ). Thus, the differences in age between these groups were not considered to be a concern. RT and CV scores for 200 individuals, aged 15-44, were obtained from CTIP normative data (Tombaugh & Rees, in press) in order to establish criterion scores. In addition to the CTIP, the TOMM was previously administered to the control and simulator groups from Experiments I and II and these scores will also be presented for comparison purposes.
Results
Frequency distributions of the SRT and SemRT scores for each group are presented in Table 1 . The solid line represents the cut-off score possessing the best sensitivity and specificity for differentiating simulators from those putting forth maximal effort. These cut-offs correspond to a RT score of less than the 1st percentile plus .1 s and a CV score less than the 1st percentile from the normative data. Inspection of this table clearly shows that the RT scores for the simulating group were substantially longer than those obtained for the other three groups. For example, the SRT scores for half of the simulator group were more than double the criterion score of .500 s. Table 2 presents the percentage of individuals correctly identified as simulating (sensitivity) or not simulating (specificity). The number of participants from the control and simulator groups identified as simulating using the cut-off score of <45 on the second learning trial of the TOMM is presented in Table 1 and sensitivity and specificity values are presented in Table 2 .
Discussion
Upon viewing Tables 1 and 2 it becomes clear that RT scores provided more useful cut-offs than CV scores because, although they possessed good specificity, CV cut-offs identified a smaller percentage of the simulating participants and, thus, were less sensitive than RT cut-offs. It also becomes apparent that the simple task provided a better measure of Table 1 Reaction times and coefficients of variation for control, mild TBI, severe TBI, and simulator groups on the simple RT and semantic search RT tests Note. n/a indicates that scores are not available for these groups. simulation than the semantic task as significantly fewer controls and patients were correctly identified as not simulating based on semantic scores compared with simple scores. Thus, of all the CTIP indices examined, the simple RT scores appear to be most useful for detecting simulated performances. Compared with simple RT scores from the CTIP, the TOMM possessed equivalent specificity (100%) but lower sensitivity (77% vs. 87%). However, these percentages are somewhat misleading because a comparison of the actual number of simulators detected using SRT scores with the number detected using the TOMM cut-off reveals that the CTIP test was only able to identify an additional three simulators. That is, the number of simulators accurately classified as simulating or not did not significantly differ between the two tests [χ 2 (1, N = 60) = 1.00, p = .32]. Therefore, the results suggest that the SRT test of the CTIP is comparable to the TOMM in its ability to detect simulated performances.
General discussion
The general results of this investigation offer suggestions as to how persons attempting to malinger may adjust their performance on neuropsychological testing. First, the simulator group obtained longer response times than did the controls on both the SRT and SemRT tests. This indicates that the simulators adjusted their performance so that the time to respond was longer than controls on both CTIP tests. This finding suggests that malingering individuals may adopt the misconception that head injury produces a generalized increase in the amount of time required to respond to all stimuli. Second, an examination of the CVs for RT scores revealed that the simulator group exhibited a greater amount of variability than did the controls on both the SRT and SemRT tests. Thus, overall, these results support previous proposals that RT measures offer an effective tool to detect malingering (Bender & Rogers, 2004; Schagen, Schmand, de Sterke, & Lindeboom, 1997; Willison & Tombaugh, 2006; Wogar et al., 1998) .
In addition, RT measures offer the advantage of providing an alternative paradigm to the overused Symptom Validity Tests (SVTs) that are becoming more and more well known to laypersons. SVTs have been shown to be highly sensitive to malingering and a review of the literature suggests they represent the method most frequently used to measure effort. However, solely relying on the SVT paradigm is not recommended for a number of reasons. Such practice will restrict the breadth of psychometric evidence available that can be used for the detection of a malingered performance. Convergent evidence gathered from a variety of sources will allow for a more reliable assessment of an individual's performance. Another problematic issue with over-reliance on SVTs is the fact that information about these tests can be easily accessed by the general public. Bauer and McCaffrey (2006) investigated the amount and type of information available on the Internet that could be found for three popular SVTs-the TOMM, the Victoria Symptom Validity Test (VSVT: Slick et al., 1997) , and the Word Memory Test (WMT: Green, 2003) . Although the majority of the websites found when searching for these tests in 2004 using the "Google" search engine were classified as being of no threat or low threat to test security, several websites were found that presented information that could potentially threaten the validity of the tests, particularly for the TOMM and the VSVT. For instance, some websites revealed information on specific cut-off scores used with the TOMM and the VSVT. Furthermore, Suhr and Gunstad (2000) presented evidence that forced-choice procedures may alert malingerers to tests used to measure effort. Because the SVT paradigm is becoming increasingly well known, there is a clear need for alternative measures of effort that are less recognizable.
Laypersons often possess erroneous beliefs or limited knowledge regarding the sequelae of head injuries (Aubrey, Dobbs, & Rule, 1989; Iverson, 1995) , and malingerers likely exaggerate their performance based on this false information. Variables introduced within the testing situation may also help them form an expectation of how they should respond on specific tests in order to successfully feign cognitive impairment. In order to examine the potential effect that contextual variables may have on malingered performances the administration of the CTIP was varied in two ways. Experiment I manipulated the order of test presentation so that either the least difficult (SRT) or most difficult (Sem RT) test was administered first. The performances of participants instructed to simulate cognitive effects of TBI on the RT tests were hypothesized to differ depending on whether they received the simple or difficult task first. It was anticipated that simulators completing the simple task first would use that experience to gauge their speed of responding on the more difficult semantic task, and would respond differently than simulators who had not experienced the simple task first. In this latter case, an absolute judgment of the difficulty of the semantic test would have been made as opposed to a relative one.
However, this speculation was not supported because the performances of the two simulator groups were not significantly different. This suggests that participants instructed to malinger were not influenced by the immediately preceding test. Apparently, both groups of simulators adopted a context-free orientation when making decisions on how they should respond on the individual tests. This is similar to the findings of Chiu and Lee (2002) who investigated the effects of task difficulty on the detection of malingering by administering two versions of the Digit Memory Test (Hiscock & Hiscock, 1989) varying in level of difficulty. All participants received both versions on different occasions. In post-experimental debriefing, participants were questioned about strategies used to evade detection. Only a few of their participants reported the use of difficulty level as the cue for their malingering behaviors.
The present study also investigated the effects that varying the number of tests administered may have on the malingered performance. Again, simulators' performances on the RT tests were hypothesized to differ depending on whether they received two or three tests. It was anticipated that simulators completing only the simple task first would have less information available to base their decision of the relative difficulty of the semantic task on compared with those simulators completing both the simple and choice tasks first. In turn, the amount of information available prior to the more difficult semantic task was expected to affect how simulators gauged their speed of responding on the semantic task. The results of the second study did not support this assumption as the introduction of the CRT test did not significantly affect the performance of either the simulators or controls on SemRT. Again, simulators' judgments on how to perform on the semantic task appeared to form from a context-free orientation to which experience with preceding tests did not contribute.
Experiment III provides evidence supporting the employability of cut-off scores from reaction time tests to detect malingering on neuropsychological examination. The data suggest that some measures and tests serve this purpose better than others. Specifically, RT criterion scores were more sensitive to simulation than those based on variability scores, and scores on the Simple RT task were more sensitive to simulation than were those on the Semantic task. The lack of sensitivity of the SemRT task was primarily due to the fact that performance on this task was too variable. That is, due to the relative difficulty of this task, the range of scores obtained by participants putting forth maximal effort was greater compared with the range of scores on the simple task. Therefore, there was a degree of overlap between the performances of simulators and TBI patients making it difficult to clearly differentiate among the groups using the cut-off scores. Performance of non-simulators was far less variable for the simple task, even severe TBI participants achieved short response times. In contrast, half of the simulators had SRT scores that were double the cut-off value, indicating the group starkly overestimated the effects of head injury on a task of this type. A comparison with the TOMM revealed that SRT criterion scores possessed equivalent specificity and sensitivity for the detection of simulation further supporting the usefulness of criterion RT scores in the identification of low effort.
The finding that the simple RT test was more sensitive to malingering than the semantic RT test is noteworthy in view of the fact that previous studies have reported that semantic RT is more sensitive than simple RT in detecting deficits in speed of information processing in TBI patients , submitted for publication) and multiple sclerosis patients (Reicker, Tombaugh, Walker, & Freedman, 2007; Tombaugh et al., 2007 , submitted for publication). In view of this, it is recommended that, of the CTIP tests, the simple task should be relied upon when evidence regarding effort is desired, whereas, the semantic task is best for determining whether impairment in information processing abilities exists. The best practice may be to first examine semantic test scores to determine whether an individual's performance falls in the impaired range and if it does, simple test scores should be examined to investigate effort.
In summary, the failure to find any effects of order or the inclusion of an intermediate choice task suggests that performance on individual CTIP tests is not affected by the immediately preceding test. Simulators appeared to base their performances on a context-free, absolute judgment of how to respond that was not affected by the manipulations. Simple RT scores were most useful for classifying participants as simulators while semantic RT scores were more sensitive to genuine impairment. Because the present study employed an experimental simulation paradigm, the results may not necessarily generalize to clinical malingerers but provide converging evidence indicating how persons attempting to malinger may perform. Further research is needed to determine whether malingerers do indeed base their performance on context-free judgments during testing and to explore test-taking strategies of malingerers in general. Future investigations should also be undertaken to examine the sensitivity and specificity of the cut-off scores that were developed for independent samples as well as for patient populations other than those included here.
